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It is commonly believed that the collapsing of the bipolar strategic environment at the end of the 20th century provided the opportunity to create a new international order. The The Army of 2020 model is a theoretical model which must not only be adapted to the present strategic environment but it should also advance to the 3Cs of the third decade of the 21 st century. Furthermore, this model is not directly connected with any specific country, but it is a NATO's Alliance Army model which may be able to meet expectation of potential future conflict. It is a kind of tool or theoretical pattern for each NATO member. Comparison between the Army 2020 model and NATO member's current armies allows one to recognize the alliance's capabilities gap, which should be filled in order to meet expectations of the future security environment. Thus, while analyzing four vital factors the implications for a potential future conflict, its potential character, the Army`s capability requirements, and its transformation priorities, it would be relevant to establish the Army of 2020 model which should pursue future challenges, changes and chances.
First, the analysis of a strategic environment's evolution enables one to determine the implications for a potential future conflict. Moreover, by observing the key worldwide trends across a variety of domains, such as natural disasters, changes in demography, natural resources, globalization, ideological movements, international crime, and the risk of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will lead one to better recognize changes and potential future global threats. As a result, it will enable one to categorize the root causes of a potential conflict as well.
Second, an assessment of the character of potential future conflicts will provide necessary information relating to the expected Army`s capability requirements. These estimations, based on global trends and anticipated scenarios, will help to identify the technological, doctrinal, procedural and mental transformations which should be applied in order to meet the Army of 2020 model MCRs. Additionally, it is necessary to compare them with other instruments of military power so that coalition and multinational aspects can be taken into consideration.
Third, the identification of the army`s capability requirements is a very important part of the Army`s pre-transformation process. Theorists argue that some generic principles such as adaptability and agility, interoperability and standardization, concepts and doctrines, procurement, and the design for export and sustainment of existing capabilities 2 should be taken into consideration as well. Predominantly, the recognition of capability gaps makes it possible to determine the key areas for development in order to fill potential capability needs.
Finally, the transformation priorities and organizational principles of the Army constitute a very essential factor. The identification of specific capability areas for the Additionally, the present world is defined more than ever before by its "knowledge based economy" where communication assets "are fueling this evolution by spreading new ideas and innovations to ever-greater numbers of people each day"
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. 12 and what is important is that access to information should not only be available to all, but, without a doubt, it should also be modified and adopted by all.
At the same time, while the information revolution is ongoing, globalization has forced the process of economic integration. The flow of goods, capital, and human resources through the international market provides a lot of benefits, as well as costs to developed and developing countries alike. Nevertheless, this economic prosperity has not resulted in the same outcome for all people, and, according to Falk, creates poverty and inequality. He asserts that "high levels of income inequality are bad for growth and are associated with many of the negative effects, including high mortality, poor education, and crumbling infrastructure." 13 Finally, social stability can be threatened, which can lead to social and political unrest. , but at the same time it can diminish a state`s influence, limit its political power, and cause a lack of global leadership. Finally, it has the potential to lead to a global political crisis.
Recently, the most important changes have occurred in the nature of conflict.
Falk and Moss claim that today`s warfare is increasingly described as being asymmetric because traditional military powers "are confronted by increasingly atypical adversaries." 16 They argue that "non-state ideologies, transnational criminal syndicates, and rogue states employ unconventional tactics in wars ambiguous in both place and time" However, a congested operational environment, characterized by a density of combat narratives and actors, creates an extremely cluttered conflict architecture, which can be perceived as advantageous, because it provides good opportunities for concealment. On the other hand, significant amounts of kinetic and non-kinetic assets may bring a negative impact as well. UK Army Doctrine argues that the demands for legitimacy and the avoidance of collateral damage make targets difficult to find, track, select and engage 22 in such a cluttered environment. It will likely require a selective attack with a high-probability of success and it may also provide the opportunity for small-size combat structures to achieve strategic effect, particularly against powerful opponents or adversaries.
Modern trends make it possible for potential adversaries to try to contest in all environments and force their will onto their opponents. British Ministry of Defense Doctrine asserts that "technological diffusion and the innovative use of existing technologies underpin this threat." 23 The authors of that publication assert that "adversaries will try to hold and exploit significant ground for political and military purposes." 24 Additionally, state and non-state actors seek to possess the CBRN capability in order to change the balance of power which may affect regional security and stability.
On the other hand, "global activity will continue to gravitate towards interconnected nodes" Today the geopolitical environment creates various legal, economic, social, ethic, moral and human norms which constitute an enormous impact for a potential conflict, and place constraints on the conduct of an operation. The international community, supported by mass media, demands transparency in the conduct of combat operations. Therefore, "the increasing difficulty in distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants requires targeting preparation and restraint in execution," 26 which, on the one hand can limit a risk, but subsequently, it can reduce a combat capability as well.
The process of ongoing globalization forces foreign nations to build coalitions, alliances, and mergers for political, economic, and/or capability reasons. Moreover, nations decide to sacrifice their military independence in order to create a strong, international security organization capable of meeting the expected combat standards.
However, conducting an operation in a multinational and joint environment may entail many challenges in the planning and execution of a mission, and it necessitates relevant physical and mental adjustments.
Identifying Required Army Capabilities
The constraints placed on the commander's freedom of action, and apart from that, often leads to highly restrictive Rules of Engagement. Particularly, the requirement for transparency, within the bounds of operational security, will put greater pressure than ever before on commanders at all levels. Every decision and operation may be "scrutinized in real time by media whose independent access to information will be virtually impossible to restrict." However, in order to meet the potential expectations of a future battlefield structural design, the Army of 2020 model must also be capable of conducting integrated, both kinetic and non-kinetic, activities so that it can eliminate the negative effects of warfare. What is more, the present improvement of weapons is not well-suited to urban operations, which seems to be important with reference to combat activities in the future for army operations. Achieving a better balance between kinetic and nonkinetic assets requires creating a full spectrum of effects by using lethal to less-than lethal weapons. Moreover, nonlethal rather than lethal capabilities seem to be very useful to deal with asymmetric threats because it minimizes the risk of fatalities and harm done to the critical infrastructure. It means that a non-lethal weapon, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV's), unmanned combat platform (UCPs), combat robots, laserbased directed energy weapons 35 (DEW), and automation and visualization's systems constitute challenges for the Army of 2020. These should be considered to fulfill future expectations. This will allow the Army of 2020 to be able to engage in conventional and also asymmetric combat against other armed forces and non -combatant players of an operational background.
On the other hand, the Army 2020 operating in the connected and informationdependent combat environment is very sensitive to cyberspace threats. Michael N. environments. 38 These seven training revolutions should meet the expected future capability requirements and allow the Army of 2020 to adapt to any potential future VUCA conflict environment. However, Gorman stresses that each conflict is unique, the army training system must emphasise a full integration of the JIIM environment. 39 It must also build the adaptability into the Army of 2020 in order to train soldiers, units and leaders to transform rapidly to meet any contingency.
Establishing Army Transformation Priorities
An effective decision-making process encompasses a full spectrum of Command Control, Communication and Information (C3I) management. Future commanders will operate in the 6C (congested, cluttered, contested, connected, constrained and coalition) operational architecture in connection with the JIIM environment, and their ability to make informed and timely decisions are now more challenging than ever.
Modern commanders should be able to estimate, analyze and solve problems, and plan solutions in the complex area. It needs to be supported by network enabled capability (NEC), which gives commanders the opportunity to assess and visualize a situation.
Additionally, a key area for development is information management and information exchange. If these key elements of the C3I system are achieved to a satisfactory level, then interoperability and standardization will gain suitable progress.
The character of contemporary conflicts and evaluation of engagement mark a significant shift in the balance of offensive capabilities into the future. The principal issue is that present engagement has been focused on a precision effect and this is set to continue into the future. An emerging technology can support this concept of evaluation by offering a wide spectrum of lethal and what are now more important non-lethal assets in order to meet the assumed future engagement assumptions.
Moreover, the ongoing lessons learned processes from recent conflicts are indicating a primary role for Army's force protection. It is crucial that the Army 2020 model should be able to reduce its own combat casualties. It generates the key lines of effort in order to design a future generation of combat equipment, platforms and assets.
The dynamic nature of threats has grown rapidly and unpredictably, which can be illustrated by the development of improvised explosive devices (IED). Additionally, the difficulty in predicting the scale of threats, both conventional and improvised, is now so diverse that it is no longer possible to protect against every known threat which can affect soldiers, vehicles, or the bases. Therefore, protection of personnel should be enhanced in the near future in order to reduce the potential for casualties and combat fatalities and to increase combat effectiveness capabilities.
However, the Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization agrees with the argument that the Army of 2020 will need to be expeditionary with the ability to project and sustain itself over strategic distances. 40 Finally, logistic activities in the land environment are becoming more and more challenging and complex, but the requirement to sustain a land force will still be a vital aspect of the Army of 2020's capabilities. The evidence from current operations in Afghanistan and the Lessons Learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom suggest that the logistics footprint should be reduced in order to decrease a major logistic burden. It is believed that shifting the emphasis from reactive to predictive supply and maintenance planning can improve sustainment capabilities, which seems to be the most challenging context of the Army of 2020`s transformation process.
Conclusions
The modern strategic environment described through the prism of seven revolutions identified by the CSID has been characterized by VUCA and it will likely be more complex in the next decade than in the recently completed post-cold war period.
The collapse of the Iron Curtain towards the end of the 20th century created a new dynamic, which has allowed for the development of a new geopolitical status quo.
Subsequently, the ongoing process of globalization joined with the evolution of technology has rebalanced the strategic security architecture as well. Moreover, the impact of the events of 9/11/2001 showed that security was not ensured forever. At the beginning of a new millennium the enduring geopolitical, social, and cultural changes moved the pivot point of the strategic environment from international to transnational dimensions involving other narratives of the strategic security milieu. Additionally, the evolution of existing risks and the diffusion of other newly-identified ones have brought about some innovative hybrid threats which will require new methods of analysis.
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Over the past decade the expansion of democracy, the building of economic powers, other sources of regional and international competition, and religious tension have all combined to create the potential causes of threats and political turbulence in different places around the world. As a result the character of future conflict has changed as well and this requires new ways, means, and ends to meet the expectations of modern societies. The authors of the Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization argue that, "the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low; however, they also stress the fact that the conventional threat cannot be ignored." 41 Following these analyses, the Army of 2020 model must be adjusted to deal with oncoming global changes and the potential conflict capability requirements. This is especially so in regard to the doctrine, technology, and training domains. Some characteristics such as adaptability, agility, 
